Insurance Brokers

Many people have argued that in the current talks about U.S. policy towards Iran, Europe and the U.S. have been playing the ?good cop/bad cop? game (you guess who the bad cop is!) This makes some sense, but the ?game? is actually more complex than involving two big action heroes (the good old Europe and the rebellious cowboy) who police the evil villain (Iranian Mullahs). Of course, one can argue that not all decision-makers in Iran are ?Mullahs,? and not all Iranian Islamic clergies think the same. A detailed attention to different factions and their political power in different levels of authority reveals that the state in Iran is not a coherent body of authority spatialized ?vertically? above the ?society,? even as it is often imagined as such. Despite what one thinks about the role of religion in the state, as Alireza has pointed out in his last post, flattening the Iranian state and the government as ?theocracy? and opposing it to American ?democracy? is too simplistic.

But, that is a different discussion than what I want to address here: a modality of government that plays an important role in managing both foreign and domestic policies in the U.S., but is not limited to the state apparatus. This is a more refined ?game? within the U.S. government that goes beyond limited understandings of a unified state. The U.S./Europe/Iran scenario trio and the ?gaming? logic, which characterize many discussions about a possible war on Iran, hinder many nuances. Such an approach to the state ignores- to borrow from Foucault- the ?multiple regime of governmentality? that brings together private and public forms of expertise and agencies- in this case in a transnational context.

Foucault?s definition of governmentality is instructive in understanding the situation at hand. Governmentality for Foucault, is ?the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatus of security? (Governmentality, 1978). It is the governmentalization of the state rather than the etatisation of society (state control) that is an important element of our times.

Why do I think Foucault?s concept of governmentality is relevant to what we are currently witnessing in the case of U.S. policy towards Iran? Let me explain. Yesterday, I got an email from the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) with the subject line that read, ?Experts Testify on Iran Policy at Congressional Hearings.? In the body of the of the email message, I read, ?Iranian People Are Our Allies, Pressure on Regime Needed, Experts Testify at House Hearing.? Wanting to know what was meant by this headline, and curious to learn who these ?experts? were, I clicked on the link and read NIAC?s report. Sure enough, I learned about these ?experts? in the second paragraph: ?Sick, who testified via video-teleconference, was joined by former US Ambassador Mark Palmer with the Committee on the Present Danger, and Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center about next steps on US policy toward Iran. The hearing follows statements made by President Bush earlier this week that the United States is conducting a ?policy review? of Iran.?

Experts

Who is Sick, you ask? He is a Senior Research Scholar and the acting director of School of International and Public Affairs? Middle East Institute at Columbia University. He served on the National Security Council under Ford, Carter and Reagan, and was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis. Sick acted as the Executive Director of Gulf/2000, an Alton Jones and Rockefeller research project at Columbia University which studied political, economic and security developments in the Persian Gulf. Sick was the Deputy Director for International Affairs at the Ford Foundation from 1982 to 1987, where he was responsible for programs relating to U.S. foreign policy. He is also a member of the board of Human Rights Watch in New York and the Chairman of the Advisory Committee of Human Rights Watch/Middle East. All of the above have qualified him as an ?expert? to appear in front of the Congress (well, via communication technologies) and testify that ?the West must keep its spotlight on Iran and encourage true voices of democracy.? A lot of Sick?s qualifications and affiliations are seemingly ?non-governmental? (human rights, academia, private foundations), but as an ?expert? with all of the interests I have listed, he is a part of the governmentality that I will address in this post.

Like Sick, Sokolski, the next ?expert? who testified is involved with both education and ?non-governmental? agencies. He is the executive director of The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), ?a project of the Institute for International Studies (IIS), [which] is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, educational organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists, and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.? (Notice, again, the non-profit, non-partisan, educational, and not-a-part-of-the-state, but a part of the government).

Now what is this ?Committee on Present Danger? (CPD) on behalf of which Palmer (the third ?expert?) testified in the House hearing a couple of days ago? CPD was founded in 1950 ?as a bipartisan education and advocacy organization dedicated to building a national consensus for a strong defense against Soviet expansionism.? Apparently, in 1976 it reemerged ?with leadership from the labor movement, bipartisan representatives of the foreign policy community and academia, all of whom were concerned about strategic drift in U.S. security policy.? While with the end of the Cold war, CPD was inactive, it is very much active now. CPD claims: ?today, radical Islamists threaten the safety of the American people and millions of others who prize liberty. The threat is global. They operate from cells in a number of countries. Rogue regimes seek power by making common cause with terrorist groups. The prospect that this deadly collusion may include weapons of mass murder is at hand. Like the Cold War, securing our freedom against organized terrorism is a long-term struggle. The road to victory begins with clear identification of the shifting threat and vigorous pursuit of policies to contain and defeat it.? (Notice again, that CPD is a non-profit/ ?non-governmental? organization with members who are academics, labor movement activists--well, at least in the 1950s- and ?independent citizens,? who are concerned about a ?threat.?)

Here is an excerpt from CPD?s mission statement (I have underlined what I consider to be key elements to my discussion):

?Our mission is to educate free people everywhere about the threat posed by global radical Islamist and fascist terrorist movements; to counsel against appeasement of terrorists; and build support for a strategy of victory against this menace to freedom? We are incorporated as a not-for-profit (501(c)(4)) organization. Our membership is limited to those in private life and does not include elected or appointed full-time federal or state officials or candidates for public office. All members serve in their individual capacities and not as official representatives of any other group or organization. We are all independent citizens. As a Committee, we recognize no ties or obligations to any Administration or political party.

? Our principal activity will be educational and the advocacy of positions based upon a full, fair and objective factual foundation. The Committee will use a variety of means to carry out its mission, such as articles in magazines and newspapers, speeches, interviews, commissioned studies, issue conferences and symposia, position papers and pamphlets, news conferences, public opinion polls and Congressional testimony. The Committee will concern itself with broad principles and policy objectives. Our concern is with strategies and goals, with the broad thrust and direction of policy, not with the details of its day-to-day implementation.?

The last sentence highlights the modalities of governmentality (policies, opinion polls, testimonies) that cannot be reduced and collapsed into the work of the state (implementation). Based on the affiliations and interests of the three "expert" witnesses, I want to suggest that these ?experts? are agents whose testimonies embody insurance technologies- which in Francois Ewald?s words is a technology of risk. I see these experts as insurance brokers who guarantee not just American democracy and ?our way of life,? but the interests of the market economy. As Ewald argues ("Insurance and Risk", 1991), insurance as a historical process and a practice of a certain type of rationality, is connected to ?geometry of hazard? and risk. Risk in insurance terms does not refer to an event happening in reality, but the probable occurrence of events that may or may not happen to capitals and values of a population. So, the risk doesn?t exist in reality, but everything can be at risk according to the art of analyzing the danger, or ?the threat? if you will. Let me examine this ?threat? and the values and capitals of the population that it puts at risk.

The Threat

According to Ewald, the insurer is not a passive agent registering the risks and offering guarantees against them. The insurer ?produces risks.? This argument fits very well with the testimonies of our insurance agents (I meant to say Middle East experts!) While the experts tell us that ?there is a very good chance that a U.S. attack on Iran would end [the] internal opposition [to the Iranian regime by ?pro-Western? Iranian people],? they do not rule out the presence of a risk. In fact, the non-military solutions suggested by these experts do not take away from the fact that they actively produce the risk: ?When asked by Lantos if they believed Iran was developing their nuclear program for peaceful reasons, all three witnesses answered no.? We have already seen the element of ?threat? in the mission statement of both NPEC and CPD. Let me give some more examples of this production of risk by our ?expert? insurance agents at NPEC in their recent testimony.

Three days ago ( February 16, 2005), the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center released the Report of the Iran Competitive Strategies Working Group. In this report, which is conveniently called ?Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran,? we read:

?these workshops [of the working group] identified three threats that are likely to increase following Iran?s acquisition of a nuclear weapons option:

? Even More Nuclear Proliferation?
? Dramatically Higher Oil Prices?
? Increased Terrorism Geared to Diminish U.S. Influence?

All of these threats are serious?.?

Thus, definition of threat in this report does not limit it to nuclear proliferation, but includes geopolitical and economic losses to the U.S. as possible risks.

The report further tells us, ?the truth is that Iran soon can and will get a bomb option. All Iranian engineers need is a bit more time -- one to four years at most. No other major gaps remain: Iran has the requisite equipment to make the weapons fuel, the know-how to assemble the bombs; and the missile and naval systems necessary to deliver them beyond its borders. As noted in the working group?s earlier report (see Checking Iran?s Nuclear Ambitions) no scheme, including ?just in time? delivery fresh fuel and removal of spent fuel from Bushehr, will provide much protection against Iran diverting its peaceful nuclear program to compliment its covert efforts to make bombs.? So while NPEC does not suggest a military solution, it actively produces a risk for which insurance measures should be taken. We are told in this report that without a regime change or a drastic change of attitude by Iranian statesmen, the risk remains probable.

Let me give you some more examples, this time from the Committee for Present Danger, in order to point to what I see as subtly different terminology used by the two organizations. As the name of the Committee for Present Danger suggests, the members of this organization seem to be concerned with more than a probable threat. They suggest that a form of danger is ?present.? This ?presence? connotes a materiality (it is here) and a temporal urgency (it is here now). Thus as we will see in the statements of the members of the CPD, they advocate for the eradication of this danger: ?this generation?s war must be won!? This organization?s website has a section called ?the threat? and the subtitle of the site is: ?dedicated to winning the war on terrorism.? But how does one reconcile this imminent threat suggested by CPD and the suggestion by NPEC that a military action on Iran will worsen the situation for the U.S.?

One explanation may be the fine line between ?danger? and ?risk? (or threat, in NPEC?s language). Danger, as Robert Castel ("From Dangerousness to Risk", 1991) has argued in the case of preventative social administration techniques in France and the United states, is a paradoxical notion. It both affirms the quality of immanent to a subject, and a mere probability, for the proof of danger could only be provided after the fact. It is this unpredictability that gives the idea that even if a person appears calm and harmless, s/he may become dangerous. On CPD?s page we read, ?murderous ideology being nothing new, the question becomes how does this threat from radical Islamic terrorists compare to previous threats? The principal difference between this ideology and the expansionist fascist and communist regimes that preceded it in the last century is that Islamist terrorism is not a regime at all. It is the perversion of a major religion (approximately 1.5 billion members worldwide) through delusions of Muslim victimhood.?

Thus while 1.5 billion Muslims may appear calm, there is always the chance of deviation: ?The ideology of Islamist terror by itself poses a dangerous threat, capable of evil committed in the name of God. Fueled by the accelerant of state support, the threat of Islamist terror increases dramatically?. But, in this case, what is proliferating are not weapons but self-anointed holy warriors. The blinding hatred that drives them is all-consuming. It leaves no room for doubting whether, given the chance, they would use any weapon of mass destruction ? nuclear, chemical or biological ? at any time against any people.? So, CPD identifies and locates the potentially dangerous by describing the ?breeding grounds? of danger in Africa, Asia- and yes- in North America, where ?Islamic terrorists? have formed ?sleeper cells?!

But how does one confine the 1.5 billion individuals who may become ?dangerous?? Immigration policies are one way of locating and controlling this danger, but in a time when Muslim diasporas are spread across the world, the confinement may not be quite practical. So, rather than a certain danger, the deployment of a probable threat becomes necessary for the development of multiple insurance strategies that promise to save the ?free world? from the harms of this internal and general risk. It is, as Castel argues, when ?the notion of risk is made autonomous than that of danger? that a systematic pre-detection becomes possible. Everyone becomes subjected to modalities of intervention that does not locate the danger in a subject, but is concerned with risk factors and statistics (work of universities, foundations, and think tanks; i.e. the ?experts?) in order to prevent the threat in any way possible. Thus, NPEC tells us that the probability of ?Iran going nuclear? is less if there is a regime change. This implicitly means the correction of the ?risk population? not through disciplinary methods (such as war), but by ?teaching? democracy through entities such as ?Radio Farda? (I wonder if this forward-looking name for the Voice of America is accidental!)

For insurance to be effective, risk has to be calculable and predictable. It is perhaps no accident that George Shultz (a Stanford professor and a fellow at the conservative think tank, Hoover; a member of the board of directors of Bechtel Group, Fremont Group, Gilead Sciences, and Charles Schwab & Co.; chairman of the International Council of J. P. Morgan Chase and chairman of the Accenture Energy Advisory Board; chairman of Ronald Reagan's Economic Policy Advisory Board) writes on the CPD website: "We face a clear and present danger, so we must identify the danger accurately and realistically, with no punches pulled, and support the necessary actions to deal with the danger decisively.? It is no accident that think tanks such as Hoover have started specific programs on developing policies to envision the ?future of Iran,? where predication seems to work both based on techniques of quantifying danger in these centers, and as a promise for a utopian future. One dimension of techniques of insurance in Ewald?s theory of risk is the principle that to calculate a risk is to master time and to discipline the future. This may translate into ?reviewing policy?, may culminate in the use of ?preemptive war? as a strategy of protecting the ?free world? from the harms of ?the dangerous,? or it could mean securing a system of training subjects into docility (another slip! I meant to say American democracy!).

With this idea of a general risk, the American population also needs to become increasingly calculable, manageable, and observed. Thus, the Patriot act, the increased general surveillance, the opinion polls about war, all become parts of these technologies of risk that pretend to eradicate risk by deploying notions of security and through creating a constant fear of the probable. Furthermore, unlike an accident, a risk concerns a population, and as Ewald argues, ?the work of the insurer is, precisely, to constitute that population by selecting and dividing risks. Insurance brings solidarity under the rhetoric of mutual interests. CPD?s mission statement is a good example of the way insurance against the ?threat of terrorism? constructs solidarity around shared national interests: ?In times of great challenge to the security of the United States, Republicans, Democrats and Independents have traditionally joined to make an assertive defense of American interests.?

Insurance in this sense is a technique of administering justice where the damage to one is borne by all. Regardless of the nature of insurance measures, one thing is clear: If you don?t buy insurance, you are responsible for the losses not just to yourself, but to all Americans, or to the whole ?free world.? That is perhaps why Midge Decter, the Former Director of the Committee for the Free World and a member of CPD tells us that "the United States is the leading ? indeed at the moment the only ? major world power. It continues, as it always has done, to play this role reluctantly. Thus each international crisis is made to seem an entirely new and separate ? and surprising ? issue to deal with. Yet whether we take up the burden of our power willingly or reluctantly, it will remain our inescapable burden still. If we fail to act, that too will be an action. It is time for Americans to understand this and to be grateful that it is they, and not some monstrous regime, who have been chosen by Providence to play this role.?

But in this ?hyper-rational? prevention, there seems to be little concern for the social and human costs of this pre-detection. There seems to be no concern for soldiers who die, no concern for civil liberties, and certainly no concern whatsoever for people who are marked as ?potential risks? and are killed in preemptive wars. But, what is ironic about the politics of insurance is that it functions through the rhetoric of rights. Ewald points out that the insurance companies have pioneered both, techniques of probabilistic calculation and disciplining the future, and the juridical form of the insurance contract (in particular the beginning of labor law). It is perhaps not a coincidence that the labor movement of the 1950s was a part of the CPD. Insurance makes security to be contractualized and legalized, where the state guarantees the stability of insurance institutions. Along the same lines, one can argue that buying into insurance measures that promise to control the threat of terrorism is represented as a way to practice and protect one?s rights. But insurance is also a guarantee for state stability. Ewald argues that insurance moves the concept of time from the life of individual to the life of society: ?In guaranteeing security, the state is equally guaranteeing itself its own existence, maintenance, permanence.? Thus as insurance brokers, the experts who have testified about the "Iranian threat" are the guarantors of state stability (reading the testimonies makes it clear that it is the stability of the United States and the state of Israel which are issues of concern).

Let me bring some more telling examples of the way the ?threat? has been described and qualified by CPD members (I call these the insurance brokers of American democracy and market economy), who are as they say ?independent citizens,? but have affiliations to state and supra-state entities. What is striking in many of these statements is the repeatability of the threat, which is another characteristic of risk. A risk is only a risk if it can be expected to happen regularly. If it is not the threat of fascism or communism, Islamism in these CPD members? rhetoric is capable of repeating September 11:

Joseph Liberman, Senator and the honorary Co-Chairman of CPD: ?The war against terrorism is not just a war of arms, but also a war of values. The threat from Islamist terrorism is the challenge of our generation, just as fascism and communism were the challenges past generations of Americans faced. We defeated those enemies, and we will defeat this one, if we stay steadfast in our purpose and true to our values. The values we cherish ? life, liberty and happiness for all ? will carry us to victory.?

John Agresto, (Former Senior Advisor for Higher Education and Scientific Research, Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq Former President, St. John's College): "In fighting terrorism we should not be deluded. We are not fighting poverty or a political movement. It's an enemy that wants nothing less than our values and way of life to be removed permanently from the world scene."

Ali Al-Ahmed, (Director of The Saudi Institute): ?The war on terrorism must be waged as a total war with guns and ideas simultaneously. The war of ideas is most important."

Peter Brookes, (Director of Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation): "The scourge of terrorism is a unprecedented challenge to international peace and stability that must be defeated through a proactive strategy of resolve and international cooperation."

Rachel Ehrenfeld, ( Director, American Center for Democracy): "Losing the War on Terrorism is not an option for the U.S.; It is time for Americans to recognize that the War on Terrorism is a war to defend the lives of each and every one of us, as well as our Western civilization."

Newt Gingrich (Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, 1995?99): "Imagine the morning after an attack even more devastating than 9/11. What is it worth for us to avoid the attack if possible and to survive it if it happens despite our best efforts?"

Lawrence J. Haas (Former Communications Director, White House Office of Management and Budget): "We praise the 'Greatest Generation' for defeating Germany and Japan. We applaud post-World War II generations for winning the Cold War. But, too often, we forget that today's War on Terrorism raises the same stakes, and requires the same commitment, as our earlier struggles. The sooner we fully recognize the danger at hand, the sooner we can address it with the energy that's needed to prevail, as we must. I expect the Committee to play a major role in this effort."

Jerome M. Hauer (Former Director, Response to Emergencies and Disasters Institute, George Washington University; Former Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Department of Health and Human Services): "The threat of terrorism has grown and the tactics of terrorists have broadened. We must find ways to defeat those who would try to change the fabric of this great nation. The Committee on the Present Danger will work to better educate our policy makers and the public in ways to reduce this rising threat."

Robert P. Kogod (Business Executive President, Hartman Institute, Jerusalem; Advisor to the Secretary, The Smithsonian Institution): "As in the past, the Committee has correctly identified a clear and present danger to our nation. Radical fundamentalism and terrorism must be confronted and destroyed as soon as possible. It is a threat similar to Fascism and Communism."

Charles M. Kupperman, (Vice President, Strategic Integration and Operations, Missile Defense Systems, The Boeing Company): "Winning the war against global terrorism is fundamental to international security in the 21st Century and we must be relentless in rooting out the terrorist network."

Hedieh Mirahmadi, (Executive Director, World Organization for Resource Development and Education): "Ultimately, our long-term success in the war against terror will be determined by how effectively free people everywhere wage the ideological battle, which cannot be fought with military might or law enforcement. As Americans, we cherish the universal human rights of freedom and we need to help others who struggle every day to enjoy those same rights."

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff (Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University): "Unlike Pearl Harbor, which led the United States to enter World War II and to achieve definably decisive victory within less than four years, the war against terror requires a long-term strategy and necessary capabilities all within a new mindset. We need unconventional responses to unconventional threats ? terrorist challenges unlike anything we have faced before 9/11."

Danielle Pletka (Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute): "Enemies of the United States are engaged in an existential war against the very principles underlying our republic. Neither jail nor courts will contain them; rather we must take the fight to them, and recognize that peace will come only though victory."

Nina Rosenwald (Council on Foreign Relations; Chairman, Board of Directors, Middle East Media and Research Institute): "If terrorism is not defeated now, it will only be more difficult and more costly to defeat it later. It would have been so much easier to stop Hitler before he crossed The Rhine."

Kenneth R. Timmerman (Executive Director, Foundation for Democracy in Iran): "Just as the Reagan administration rolled back Communist tyranny, today we can roll back the tyranny of radical Islam and the terrorist regimes it has spawned. But the first battle will be here at home, where we must defeat the blame-America-first pundits of political correction."

William Van Cleave, (Professor, Southwest Missouri State University; Director, Center for Defense and Strategic Studies; Senior Defense Advisor, 1979?81): "Islamic terrorism is an unconditional and existential threat not only to America and Israel, but also to Judeo-Christian culture. We have no choice but to recognize that war has been thrust upon us, and that principles of warfare apply. Only by denying success to this threat ? by a combination of anticipatory defensive and offensive measures ? can we defeat it."

Governmentality and Political economy

So far I have focused on the notion of threat/security and the population. As Foucault suggests, there is a third element to governmentality: that of political economy. How is the art of governing through insurance relate to political economy? Ewald argues that what is insured is not the injury suffered by a person, but ?a capital against whose loss the insurer offers a guarantee.? Insurance provides the principle for the objectification of people and their relations. Ewald?s argument may not quite address forms of governmentality that extend beyond the limits of the nation-state. However, I believe that it is this ?solidarity through things? that brings the neo-liberal economy to the forefront of discussions about policies towards Iran. The report produced based on the study conducted for NPEC by energy researchers at Rice University reveals that the insurance against the ?threat? of terrorism is closely tied to neo-liberal economy:

?Historically, after a major terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia, markets worry, the price of oil increases, and Iran?s own oil revenues, in turn, surge upward?.Given that one-fifth of the world?s entire oil demand flows through the Straits (as well as roughly a quarter of America?s supply of oil) and no other nation that has fortified its shores near Hormuz, an Iranian threat to disrupt commerce there would have to be taken seriously by commercial concerns (e.g., insurers and commodity markets) and other nations.?

The fact that the markets are the main concern for these "experts" reveals that it is not just "our values" and rights, nor democracy that is being insured here (although that seems to be the claim); what is being insured is the market in neo-liberal economy.

As the claims about ?exporting democracy? in the "war on terror" have proven, neo-liberalism is not limited to economic policies, but involves the dissemination of market values to all social action. Unlike classical liberalism, neo-liberalism does not conceive the rational economic behavior as natural, but as organized by law and in need of political intervention. Thus, the discourse on the project of ?rationalization? of Iranian economy, more often than not, is coupled with advocacy for social norms such as freedom and democracy- which in an arbitrary manner is supposed to facilitate competition and free trade. Too often, causal links are drawn between democracy and market economy. It seems as if it is a given fact that democracy and free market go hand-in hand together.

While market, and not the state, becomes the regulative principle of society, rational action on behalf of every member of society, and legal protection become necessities to a successful economic mechanism within the neo-liberal language that privileges economic growth. State legitimacy becomes contingent upon the extent and speed of implementation of this economic rationality. Hence, the call for a regime change is only one suggested strategy by NPEC. A drastic change in Iranian state?s economic policies is their other alternative.

Unlike classical liberalism, neo-liberalism extends the economic domain to every sphere of life and constructs individuals as entrepreneurial actors. As such, the free rational individual becomes responsible for her/his actions, even if her/his actions are limited by unemployment and limited state-subsidized welfare. The ideal neo-liberal individual becomes one who chooses between the economic options, rather than seeking to change these options. Thus, any critique of global capitalism is suspended as an obstacle to the flow of ?progress? in the world economy.

What we are witnessing in the case of Iran shows that the only two available options are either the one suggested by the ?experts? who I have discussed here, or a military attack. This makes this ?game? a catastrophic living reality for people who live in Iran. Unfortunately, despite the celebrations of some Iranians who prefer neo-liberal insurance brokers? suggestions as a healthy alternative to war, neo-liberal economic policies have proven to increase the gap in poverty in both national and international levels. More often than not, neo-liberal policies support authoritarian and corrupt states.

Reading the NPEC report and Sokolski?s testimony leave no doubt in my mind that the objective of these testimonies is to secure the global market, to give geopolitical privileges to Israel and the U.S., to allow further activity of multi-national corporations in the region, and to restrict immigration. Their non-military solution is only a profitable insurance technology that can easily change to preemptive war if the conditions of the "game" change. Because of the contingency of the political environment in the Middle East, terms of security and notions of risk will be deployed differently to guarantee the interests of the market and U.S. imperialism. This may very well mean that preemptive war can be suggested by the same ?experts? as an insurance strategy. We have seen such drastic changes in the case of Iraq, haven?t we? Think Hoover. Think Larry Diamond. Think the Progressive Report! These policy-making think tanks that are embedded in U.S. educational institutions can cause devastating material effects on many people's lives. The neo-liberal discourses of these ?experts? may not immediately subject the Iranian people to the violence of war. But the other option does not look very promising either.

*Sima Shakhsari is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Cultural and Social Anthropology at Stanford University.